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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Manivest does not intend to reply to each and every 
argument in the Howes' brief, since most of those arguments are 
adequately addressed in Manivest's opening brief. Instead, 
Manivest will focus on those core issues that are at the heart 
of this case. 
At page 32 of their brief, the Howes state: "This 
lawsuit is not about rent. It is about fairness and observance 
of agreements." The Howes are only half right. From 
Manivest's standpoint, the lawsuit is about fairness. However, 
it is clear from the record and from their own brief that, from 
the Howes' standpoint, this lawsuit is about their dissatis-
faction with the amount of the rent fixed by the lease. 
The Howes' crusade to extricate themselves from the 
lease has featured strategies that scorn the Howes' claim to 
fairness. In order to break the lease, the Howes have 
attempted to find lease defaults that could not be cured. The 
Howes relied upon alleged defaults that were never the subject 
of any notice to the Howes, which, of course, gave Manivest no 
opportunity to cure those alleged defaults. They relied upon 
alleged defaults that either occurred after the lease was 
already purportedly terminated, or were first raised after 
termination, and thus could not have been a basis for 
termination. They also relied upon alleged defaults that were 
not defaults, or that had been cured either before the Howes 
became aware of them, or before trial. Nonetheless, all of 
these same alleged defaults also formed the basis for the trial 
court's ultimate decision allowing forfeiture. Now, in their 
brief on this appeal, the Howes rely upon a lease provision 
prohibiting assignments for the benefit of creditors, even 
though this provision was not relied upon below.—/ 
Principles of fairness that find expression in Utah 
law will not sanction forfeiture in these circumstances. This 
Court has held that even absent express contractual language 
requiring notice of default and opportunity to cure, they are 
required as a condition precedent to forfeiture. Thus, even 
assuming that the standard of review is "manifest injustice," 
such an injustice has occurred here. 
The Howes base their claim to attorneys' fees and 
costs upon the lease language. However, the lease defines 
attorneys' fees as costs. Under Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Howes' application for attorneys' fees and 
other costs was submitted too late to be considered by the 
trial court. The Howes' contention that the attorneys' fees 
award should be affirmed, even if judgment on the merits is 
reversed, is another example of their overreaching. 
As to the Howes' cross appeal, they argue that the 
lease requires Manivest to spend hundreds of thousands of 
dollars to improve the leased property, while at the same time 
arguing that the leasehold cannot be used to secure the 
financing needed for such improvements. Moreover, even if the 
1/ The only reference to this provision was on pp. 5-6 of 
the Howes' trial brief (R. 435), which was submitted at 
the close of the evidence in lieu of oral argument, and 
to which Manivest had no opportunity to respond. 
trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence related to the 
maintenance issue, which Manivest disputes, at most the Howes 
are entitled to a new trial. Manivest does not dispute the 
need for a new trial, given the taint created by the trial 
court's errors. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
CLEAR WRITTEN NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO CURE 
WERE REQUIRED AS TO EACH ALLEGED DEFAULT THAT 
FORMED THE BASIS FOR LEASE FORFEITURE 
At page 9 of their brief the Howes argue that the 
lease did not require written notice of default. See also, 
Verified Complaint, 1[ 29 (Add No. 2 to Manivest's opening 
brief.) Nonetheless, they also argue that they gave Manivest 
adequate written notice of the alleged defaults and an 
opportunity to cure. There is no merit to these arguments. 
In Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1976), 
the seller under an installment contract for the sale of real 
property (which is not dissimilar to a 50 year ground lease) 
contended that the buyer's interest had been forfeited, even 
though no written notice of default or opportunity to cure had 
been given. Unlike the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and Like paragraph 9 of the lease at issue here (Add No. 1 to 
Manivest's opening brief), the contract in Hansen did not 
require notice of default or opportunity to cure. Instead, the 
contract "provided that after the continuance of a default for 
ninety days the seller had a right to exercise three options" 
(i.e. foreclosure, forfeiture, or other legal remedy). Id. at 
1154. 
Nonetheless, this Court held that these contractual 
provisions "are not self executing. They require some 
affirmative act on the part of the seller." The Court also 
held that mere notice of termination, without opportunity to 
cure, was not enough\—/\ 
[T]he seller must give the defaulting buyer 
a reasonable time within which to cure the 
default. Without this notice the defaulting 
buyer would not know what to do. He would 
not have certain knowledge his tenancy was 
at an end. He could assume that the seller 
may have waived default, or would elect to 
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it; 
or he could assume he would be permitted to 
perform." 
(Id. Footnote omitted.)±/ 
Hansen applies here, even in the face of paragraph 9 
of the lease, which states that in the event the lessees "fail 
2/ In Johnston v. Austin, 748 P.2d 1084 (Utah 1988), this 
Court held that where the seller chooses the remedy of 
acceleration of the contract rather than forfeitures, 
notice of default and an opportunity to cure are not 
necessary unless required by the contract. To that 
extent only, the Court overruled Hansen. However, the 
Court reaffirmed Hansen, as applied to contractual 
forfeitures: "Forfeiture is a harsh remedy, and a seller 
must therefore give a buyer notice of default and a 
reasonable period of time in which to cure the default 
before exercising a forfeiture provision." 748 P.2d 
1086-1087 (citations omitted). That this requirement 
applies regardless of the contractual provisions is shown 
by the next sentence of the Court's opinion: "In fact, 
written notice of default is expressly required by . . . 
the contract." I_d. at 1087. 
3/ See Also, Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d 
Landlord and Tenant, Vol 1, § 13.1, comment h. at p. 389 
(1976): 
The landlord may hold the tenant in default, 
under the rule of this section, for the tenant's 
failure to perform a promise contained in the 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
to keep any covenant herein contained to be performed by 
Lessees, or within sixty (60) days thereafter, then in that 
event, without notice from the Lessors, this Agreement shall 
cease and terminate...." 
First, this provision is not self-executing, even 
though forfeiture is the only remedy expressly provided. As 
suggested in Hansen, the lessors could waive the default, or 
they could elect to affirm rather than forfeit the contract and 
sue for damages, specific performance or some other remedy, or 
they could allow the lessees to cure.17 
Second, the fact that the Howes did give notices of 
default and of forfeiture either evidences their belief that 
paragraph 9 was not self-executing, or constitutes a waiver or 
estoppel as to any claim that it was self-executing. 
Third, the requirement of notice in Hansen is not 
simply to inform the lessee which remedy the lessor has elected 
to invoke upon the lessee's default. The notice mandated by 
Hansen is a product of simple fairness, by giving the lessee 
facing forfeiture "a reasonable time within which to cure the 
default". Hansen at 545 P.2d 1154. Under Hansen, opportunity 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
lease only if the landlord has requested the 
tenant to perform and given him a reasonable 
opportunity to do so. 
4_/ Also, paragraph 11 of the lease, now also relied upon by 
the Howes in their brief, is expressly not 
self-executing. Paragraph 11 provides that in the event 
of lessees' assignment for the benefit of creditors, "the 
Lessor may terminate this Lease ..." (Emphasis 
added.) As in Hansen, forfeiture is optional, not 
automatic. 
to cure is required regardless of which remedies are otherwise 
available, even the remedy of a "self-executing" forfeiture. 
Attached as Addenda "A", "B" and MCM hereto (Trial Ex. 
30, and 31) are copies of the three notices (dated March 30, 
1988, April 29, 1988 and May 31, 1988) offered up by the Howes 
to justify forfeiture of Manivest's leasehold. The only 
defaults complained of in these notices are the December 1987 -
January 1988 lease pledges to Valley Bank as security for 
financing, and "piles of Christmas-time trash and last year's 
crop of obnoxious weeds . . . and . . . the surface of the 
parking lot is not and for some period of time has not been in 
good order or repair . . .". (Add. "A", p. 2). 
Nonetheless, at trial the Howes summoned up a host of 
other alleged defaults that were never the subject of any 
notice of default prior to termination. These same alleged 
defaults also found their way into the trial court's Findings 
of Fact (Add. No. 4 to Manivest's opening brief) and were the 
foundation for the trial court's imposition of the harsh 
judgment of forfeiture. These "notice-less" alleged defaults 
included: 
1. Purported encroachments in 1983 (Trial Ex. 
10, Finding No. 5); 
2. A May, 1978 pledge of the lease to First 
Security Bank as security for financing (Trial Ex. 11, Finding 
No. 6), which was subsequently released (Tr. 253, 254); 
3. A pledge of the lease to Valley Bank as 
security for financing in 1982 (Trial Ex. 12-14, Finding No. 
7), which also was subsequently released (Tr. 254); 
4. Lease assignments between Manivest 
controlled entities in 1976 and 1978 (Trial Ex. 22, Finding No. 
19); 
5. A purported assignment to the Manivest 
Liquidating Trust on April 28, 1988 (Trial Ex. 21, 40, Finding 
No. 20); 
6. Alleged violations of Murray City ordinances 
in 1983, and in 1989 after the lease had already been 
purportedly terminated (Trial Ex. 23, 26, 28, 37, Findings No. 
21, 22); 
7. Alleged health and safety violations ob-
served in 1989 or 1990, again long after the lease had purport-
edly been terminated (Trial Ex. 39, Tr. 168, Finding No. 23); 
8. Underground Storage Tanks (Finding No. 24). 
The Howes* brief bristles with contentions that 
Manivest enjoyed "grace periods" (p. 45) and the opportunity to 
cure these defaults. This assertion is belied not only by the 
Howes' failure to give notice of the alleged defaults 
enumerated above, but also by the content of the notices they 
did give. 
Where is the "grace period" in the Howes' initial 
notice of March 30, 1988? That notice simply stated: "Based 
upon these defaults, it is our position that we are entitled to 
terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease" (Add. "A", p. 2). 
The Howes' April 29, 1988, notice demanded performance17 but 
5_/ However, the April 29 notice addressed only the lease 
pledge to Valley Bank, not the allegations regarding 
weeds, debris and potholes in the parking lot. 
did not specify what the purported "grace period" was: "On 
behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise you that time is of the 
essense [sic] and that we insist upon strict performance . . ." 
(Add. "B", p. 2), 
Other than indicating that time was of the essence, 
this second purported notice gave no inkling of the period in 
which cure was expected. Was it 60 days, as one might infer 
from paragraph 9 of the lease, or a longer or shorter period? 
Did the period begin to run from April 29, 1988, when 
performance was first demanded, or from March 30, 1988 when the 
Howes attempted to terminate the lease without giving any 
opportunity to perform? The third notice dated May 31, 1988 
(Add. "C"), purported to terminate the lease effective upon 
receipt of the notice, even though it was sent only 32 days 
after the April 29 notice first requesting performance,^ 
Thus, even the notices of default that the Howes did 
give were too "indefinite or uncertain" to sustain a 
forfeiture. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Maxwell, 659 
P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983). Also, forfeiture is permitted 
only where the agreement itself has "clear and unequivocal 
terms." I_d. Here, even if the Howes* tortured interpretations 
of the lease were correct, it suffers from "ambiguity or lack 
£/ The Howes also argue that Manivest was remiss in failing 
to cure even after the date upon which its interest in 
the lease was forfeited, which the trial court found to 
be June 1, 1988 (Conclusion No. 8). However, based upon 
this finding, Manivest no longer owed the Howes any 
contractual duties after that date. 
of clarity" fatal to a claim for forfeiture, because it failed 
to provide Manivest adequate notice of what was required in 
order to avoid forfeiture.-1' Id. 
It is no answer for the Howes to argue that Manivest 
was put on notice of the newly alleged defaults by inclusion of 
some documents on a pre-trial exhibit list, or that Manivest 
was required to send out interrogatories to ferret out 
allegations of default not contained in any notice, or even the 
Complaint. By this time Manivest1s leasehold interest had 
already been forfeited, at least according to the trial court. 
Moreover, Hansen and Maxwell establish that it is the duty of 
the party seeking forfeiture to provide adequate notice of 
default, not the burden of the party against whom forfeiture is 
sought to play a guessing game. In short, allegations of 
default, even if proven to be true, will not support the harsh 
remedy of forfeiture, if not included in a notice of default. 
Reeploeg v. Jensen, 490 P.2d 445, 447 (Wash. App. 1971), rev'd 
on other grounds 503 P.2d 99 (Wash. 1972), cert. den. 414 U.S. 
839 (1973); Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719, 720-721 (Ariz. 
App. 1989). 
2/ Another example of this ambiguity is the 60-day period 
referenced in paragraph 9. When does this period begin 
to run? Is some notice required to start the period, 
even though that same paragraph purports to eliminate any 
notice requirement? Can the lessor secretly observe a 
default on day one, hope the lessee doesn't discover or 
cure the default, and then declare a forfeiture on day 61 
as a "gotcha"? To permit such a result is to forsake 
fairness and to ignore the drastic consequences of 
forfeiture. 
Manivest argued the notice issues at trial in the 
context of its objections, on grounds of surprise, to the 
Howes' eleventh-hour default allegations. (Tr. 44-52, 96,) 
Because these allegations did not appear in any pleading filed 
by the Howes before trial, and because the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying Manivest1s motion to adjourn the 
trial to permit Manivest to prepare a defense to the new 
claims, Manivest had no opportunity to raise the notice defects 
in any other context. 
In any event, the trial court committed plain error in 
premising the forfeiture on the belated default allegations. 
Accordingly, the Judgment of Forfeiture and Order of Possession 
must be reversed, and the lease must be reinstated and 
possession returned to Manivest. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE 
WAS MANIFESTLY UNJUST. 
Forfeiture here was manifestly unjust not only because 
of the absence of notice and opportunity to cure, but also 
because it was based upon assignments that did not violate the 
lease, and upon technical, non-material defaults. 
A. Manivest Did Not Violate any Prohibitions Against 
Assignment of the Lease or Covenants Against 
Encumbrance of the "Demised Premises". 
The Howes concede that Manivest's assignments as 
security for financing did not violate the prohibition against 
lease assignments in paragraph 4 of the lease. Instead, they 
continue to argue that these assignments breached the covenant 
in paragraph 6 against encumbering the "demised premises". 
However, if the Howes (or their predecessors-in-interest) 
intended to prevent the lessors from using the value of the 
leasehold to secure financing, it was incumbent on the Howes to 
clearly articulate this prohibition in the lease. General 
restraints on lease assignments or encumbrances, which do not 
unambiguously apply to pledges of the leasehold for security, 
do not suffice, particularly when the consequence of a 
transgression is forfeiture. 
At page 43 of their brief, the Howes rely on R. 
Powell's treatise on real property for an expansive definition 
of the word "encumbrance". However, the Howes overlook 
Professor Powell's comments which bear most directly on the 
facts here: 
Modern courts almost universally adopt the 
view that restrictions on the tenant's right 
to transfer are to be strictly construed. 
Thus it has been held that lease provisions 
prohibiting 'assignments' were not violated 
by . . . mortgaging the lease term; by sale 
of the controlling stock in the tenant 
corporation or change in the personnel of 
the tenant partnership . . . 
R. Powell, The Law of Real Property Volume 2, 1[ 248[1] at pp. 
17-43, 17-44 (1991 ed. ) (footnotes omitted). See also, 
Restatement of the Law (Second) Property 2d Landlord & Tenant, 
Vol. 2, § 15.2, comment e., at p. 102 (1976) and illustrations 
thereto. Powell similarly states: 
A lease, which creates a present possessory 
interest in the tenant, is an entirely 
separate interest from the landlord's future 
reversionary interest in the property. 
Thus, the tenant in the absence of a 
covenant in the lease or a statutory 
restriction, has the right to mortgage his 
interest in the property separately. 
R. Powell, supra, If 258[1], p. 17A-57 (footnote omitted). 
The covenant against encumbrances of the "demised 
premises" in paragraph 6 fails to differentiate between the 
lessor's interest in those premises and the lessee's interest, 
and thus cannot be construed as prohibiting mortgages of only 
the lessee's interest under the rule of strict construction 
suggested by Powell. 
At page 36 of their brief, the Howes argue that 
paragraph 6 was designed to protect their presumed right to 
collect rentals from Manivest subtenants in the event 
Manivest's interest was terminated. However, the Howes had no 
such right because they had no privity of contract with the 
subtenants. R. Powell, supra, at If 248[1], p. 17-39. See 
also, the portion of paragraph 4 of the lease prohibiting any 
subleases from binding the Howes. Instead, termination of the 
Manivest lease would terminate the subleases and any 
assignments thereof. Accordingly, Manivest's pledges of its 
leasehold interest or subleases could not jeopardize any 
"right" of the Howes, whether at law or reserved by the lease. 
Nor did the assignments among the Manivest controlled 
entities violate paragraph 4 of the lease. The Howes* attempts 
to distinguish Prince v. Elm Inv. Co., Inc. 649 P.2d 820 (Utah 
1982) because it involved a tenant's right of first refusal are 
to no avail. The relevant issue both in Elm and here was 
whether a stranger has been inserted into the transaction. The 
fact that the Elm plaintiff sought to enforce a right of first 
refusal rather than compel a forfeiture does not diminish Elm's 
precedential value. Under the principles of Elm (at pp. 
822-823), limited partnerships that have the same general 
partner, or wholly owned corporate subsidiaries, are not 
"strangers" to the transaction, contrary to the Howes' argument 
at p. 32 of their brief.-x The quotes from Powell above 
suggest that, if anything, the principles of Elm apply with 
even greater force to the issue of who is a stranger to the 
lease for purposes of construing a prohibition on lease 
assignments. 
Also, the testimony of Larry Leeper or Swen Mortenson 
about their understanding of the relationship between Manivest 
and the Manivest Liquidating Trust, or about their relationship 
with the two entities, could not change the clear language of 
the trust document. That language provides that the lease at 
issue here was excluded from the assets transferred to the 
trust, and was retained by Manivest. (Manivest Liquidating 
Trust and Workout Plan, Note 1 to the Balance Sheet of 
Diversified Realty, Ltd., Trial Ex. 22, 40). Accordingly, 
there was no assignment in violation of either paragraph 4 or 
paragraph 11 of the lease. 
B. The Forfeiture of the Lease Constituted 
A Windfall to the Howes. 
In addition to the "assignments" discussed above, 
Manivest also disputes the Howes' other allegations of default, 
8^/ The Howes acknowledged as much here, by suing not 
National Realty, Ltd., the limited partnership that was 
the named successor tenant on the lease, but its general 
partner Manivest, which was also the general partner of 
the assignee limited partnerships (Tr. 262), and the 
parent of the wholly-owned subsidiary assignee, Westco 
Realty, Inc. (Trial Ex. 40, p. 2). 
as set forth in Manivest's opening brief.-1' Manivest will 
not restate those arguments here. Instead, Manivest will 
revisit the issue of materiality, specifically the trial 
court's failure to properly consider and apply standards for 
assessing the materiality of Manivest's alleged defaults. 
Among other things, the trial court failed to put the 
effect of the forfeiture into context. At the time of trial, 
the parties were 30 years into a 50-year ground lease. What 
was a weed patch when the lease was consummated in 1960, had 
become a thriving shopping center—a transformaton achieved 
solely through the efforts and dollars of Manivest and its 
predecessors-in-interest. The Howes argue that the $2,000,000 
in tenant improvements (Trial Ex. 47) should be ignored. This 
is easy for them to argue, since they invested not one penny 
towards those improvements .J-£/ 
The value of the improvements is relevant not in 
determining the value of the leasehold that Manivest stood to 
9/ At page 23 of their brief, the Howes state: "Notably, 
Manivest does not contest the fact of default." This is 
patently false, since Manivest has contested the default 
allegations at every stage of these proceedings, 
including this appeal. 
10/ Perhaps this fact also explains the relatively low fixed 
rental. Moreover, the reason the parties agreed upon a 
50-year lease term was to encourage the magnitude of 
tenant investment in improvements that only such a term 
would justify. The Howes reneged on that agreement, 
when, slightly over midway through the lease period, they 
began to look for any excuse to forfeit the lease. 
lose through f orf eiture,J-J-/ but in measuring what the Howes 
stood to gain. The trial court improperly disregarded the size 
of the windfall to be bestowed on the Howes in evaluating 
whether Manivest's conduct merited forfeiture. 
The Howes' windfall may actually be somewhat less than 
$2,000,000, since, in any event, the Howes would have acquired 
the improvements in the year 2010. Nevertheless, the Court 
failed to consider and assess the scope of the gain to be 
enjoyed by the Howes, in ascertaining whether a forfeiture 
would bring about an excessively disproportionate economic 
dislocation. Instead, the Court improperly compared apples to 
oranges by purporting to "offset" the unascertained value of 
the Howes* reversionary interest, against the value of the 
Manivest leasehold. (Add No. 3 to Manivest's opening brief, 
P. 7.) 
At page 45 of their brief, the Howes concede in effect 
that they could not prove "numerical damages" but go on to 
baldly assert that "the fact of great harm to the Howes is 
established" (emphasis in original). What is this "great harm 
to the Howes? The only discussion of it is at pages 20-21 of 
their brief: 
1. Underground storage tanks and health and safety 
violations allegedly "exposed the Howes to severe 
11/ Contrary to the suggestion in the Howes' brief, although 
Manivest disagrees with the finding that the leasehold 
had a present value of $500,000-$600,000, using a 
discounted cash flow analysis, Manivest does not appeal 
from that finding. 
liabilities." However, the Howes presented no evidence that 
any such claims were asserted against them by governmental 
agencies or otherwise. Moreover, these alleged defaults were 
first raised at trial, when it was too late for Manivest to do 
anything about them. 
2. While the Howes also claim potential harm from 
the alleged encroachments, they do not address Manivest's 
argument that they didn't own the property subject to the 
alleged encroachment. Again, this alleged default was also 
first raised at trial, as was the alleged assignment to the 
Manivest Liquidating Trust. 
3. The Howes concede that there was no evidence that 
their predecessors-in-interest would not have entered into the 
lease if they could have forseen the alleged defaults. 
However, the Howes suggest that this Finding of Fact "was 
another way of saying that the defaults were material." This 
begs the question. The Howes' reliance on similar unsupported 
conclusory adjectives used by the trial court, e.g. 'material 
breaches,' 'substantial nature,' 'primary importance', suffers 
from the same infirmity. Calling a breach material does not 
make it so. 
4. The Howes also argue that they were "harmed" by 
their own refusal to accept rent after giving notice of 
termination, and by the attorneys' fees and costs they incurred 
as a result of their own decision to file suit. The paucity of 
these arguments is self evident. 
5. Whether "[t]he condition of the property was a 
source of concern to the Howes" or, just as subjectively, "they 
considered the defaults to be material" is irrelevant. 
Forfeiture cannot be based upon the whims of the Howes. 
6. Finally, at page 21 of their brief, the Howes 
rely upon the "[t]ime is of the essence" provision in the 
lease, and unabashedly misrepresent the record by stating that 
"all of the defaults persisted long after notice and a 
reasonable opportunity to cure" (emphasis added). As discussed 
above, most of the alleged defaults were not the subject of any 
notice or opportunity to cure and were first raised at trial. 
Thus, in response to the Howes' query at p. 21: "Why didn't 
Manivest just take care of them?", Manivest asks: Why wasn't it 
given any opportunity to do so, if these purported defaults 
were so important to the Howes? The answer is clear. The 
Howes didn't want "cures", they wanted the property. 
Contrary to the Howes' arguments and the trial court's 
findings, Manivest did not simply ignore the default 
allegations that were the subject of the March 30, 1988 
notice. Larry Leeper promptly responded by letter dated 
April 1, 1988 (Trial Ex. 30), properly disputing the contention 
that the Howes' consent was required for the pledge of the 
lease to Valley Bank as security for financing. This position 
was later reaffirmed by Manivest's legal counsel. (TriaL Ex. 
32). Mr. Leeper's April 1 letter further indicated that 
maintenance issues would be addressed. 
In sum, Manivest invites this Court to scrutinize the 
record in search of defaults that would justify termination of 
a 50-year ground lease at midterm, without adequate notice or 
opportunity to cure, and the transfer to the Howes of 
$2,000,000 in tenant improvements and more than half of a 
million dollars in discounted cash flow. No such defaults can 
be found. 
III. 
THE HOWES* INTERFERENCE WITH MANIVEST'S FINANCING 
FROM VALLEY BANK VIOLATED THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING, AS ALLEGED IN MANIVEST'S 
COUNTERCLAIM. 
The Howes violated the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing in two ways. First, they wrongfully contended 
that their consent was required for use of the lease as 
security for the financing from Valley Bank. As shown above, 
their consent was not required. Second, they wrongfully 
withheld that consent for an improper purpose, i.e., to force 
renegotiation of the lease, specifically the amount of the 
rental. Accordingly, the trial court also erred in dismissing 
Manivest's counterclaim. 
At page 27 of their brief, the Howes state: M[T]here 
is no factual support for the argument that the Howes objected 
to the transfers to obtain increased rents." (Footnote 
omitted.) Then, at pp. 36-37, the Howes provide the allegedly 
missing support: "The practical consequence of this structure 
was that the parties would be required to negotiate if either 
wanted to use its respective interest for financing purposes 
other than for the original improvements." (footnote 
omitted.) What would be the subject of these negotiations? 
The answer is found in footnote 36 to the last quoted sentence, 
where the Howes complain that "there were no percentage rents 
and no cost of living adjustments." 
This Court has held that there is an implied covenant 
not to withhold consent unreasonably. Elm, supra, at 649 P.2d 
825 also stands for the proposition that where a contract 
requires the consent of one party before the second party may 
act (whether it be consent to a lease pledge or to any other 
act) the first party ". . . has no right to withhold 
arbitrarily his approval; there must be a reasonable 
justification for doing so." Id. (Citations omitted, emphasis 
added.)— ' 
The Howes also argue that Manivest in effect waived 
the right to demand that the Howes act reasonably, by pledging 
the lease to Valley Bank before requesting their consent. Two 
argument dispatch this claim. First, Manivest correctly 
believed that the Howes' consent was not required. Their 
consent was sought only at the urging of Valley Bank, as a 
precautionary measure. Second, since the Howes intended to 
condition their consent on renegotiation of the lease, any 
advance request to the Howes would have been futile. 
While both the Howes and the trial court accused 
Manivest of bad faith, it is the Howes, not Manivest, that wear 
the black hats here. 
12/ The Howes present a novel "choice of law" argument at p. 
28 of their brief. One must not only look to the place 
of contracting, but also to the status of the emerging 
case law at the precise instant in time when the contract 
is consummated. Suffice it to say that the Howes cite no 
authority for such a rule of law. Also, the Howes' 
attempt at p. 31, n.32, to distinguish Campbell v. 
Westdahl, 715 P.2d 288 (Ariz. App. 1985) on the basis 
that the landlord there "blatantly withheld consent to 
(Footnote continued on next page) 
IV, 
IN THE EVENT THE FORFEITURE CLAIM IS NOT DISMISSED, 
MANIVEST IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL FREE FROM 
THE TAINT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS. 
Even if the forfeiture claims survive the foregoing 
arguments, Manivest is at least entitled to a new trial. In 
Jack B, Parson Construction Co. v. State of Utah, 72 5 P.2d 614 
(Utah 1986) (as amended on rehearing), this Court's initial 
opinion ruled that the trial court had committed numerous legal 
errors, but affirmed the judgment against the plaintiff based 
on the trial court's findings of fact, to which this Court 
deferred. On plaintiff's petition for rehearing, this Court 
withdrew that opinion and issued an amended opinion ordering a 
new trial. At p. 618, the amended opinion indicated that 
because this Court could not determine the extent to which the 
trial court's factual findings were infected with its legal 
errors, a new trial would be necessary. 
Here, as in Parson, it is impossible to determine the 
extent to which the trial court's individual errors tainted its 
ultimate decision. For example, Finding No. 25 indicates that 
the trial court relied upon " . . . particularly the breaches 
regarding assignments, encumbrances and other related lease 
terms . . ."as the material defaults justifying forfeiture. 
If some or all of these alleged assignments or encumbrances 
(Footnote continued from previous page) 
transfer the lease in order to charge additional rent . . 
." is similarly misplaced, given the identical position 
taken by the Howes here. 
were not defaults, or lacked necessary accompanying notice and 
opportunity for cure, would any remaining defaults have been 
sufficiently material that the trial court would have awarded 
forfeiture? The only way to tell is through a new trial. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN AWARDING THE HOWES 
ATTORNEYS1 FEES AND COSTS. 
The Howes argue that their claim for attorneys' fees 
and costs lives or dies by the terms of paragraph 25 of the 
lease. However, paragraph 25 defines "costs" to include 
attorneys' fees.—x Accordingly, both the attorneys' fees 
and the other "costs" sought by the Howes were governed by the 
requirements of Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
including the mandatory requirement of a timely bill of costs. 
The Howes' cost bill was untimely. Thus, even if the Howes 
prevail on the merits, the award of attorneys' fees and other 
costs must be reversed.J-±/ 
At page 48, the Howes argue they are entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs, even if the judgment is 
13/ " . . . The defaulting party shall pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorneys' fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing this Agreement, or in 
obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby, or 
in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder . . .". 
14/ The Howes' brief also demonstrates that the amount of the 
award was excessive. At p. 47, n. 39 and p. 49, n. 43, 
the Howes indicate that the fees awarded included those 
in defending against Valley Bank's motion to intervene. 
Those fees are beyond the scope of paragraph 25. 
reversed.—' This is untenable. Even if one or more of the 
default findings is affirmed, reversal of the forfeiture means 
that the award of attorneys' fees must also be reversed. 
Forfeiture was the only remedy sought by the Howes. Upon 
reversal, they will not have succeeded in "enforcing" the 
lease, "obtaining possession" or "pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder". To the contrary, Manivest will have succeeded in 
"enforcing" its rights under the lease, such as the right to 
make the assignments complained of by the Howes, or will have 
succeeded in "obtaining possession of the premises". Thus, it 
will be Manivest, not the Howes, that will be entitled to 
attorneys' fees and costs, both in the trial court and on this 
appeal. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE ON 
THE ISSUE OF STRUCTURAL MAINTENANCE OF THE 
IMPROVEMENTS. 
At trial, the lower court ruled that the tenant's 
maintenance responsibilities under paragraph 5 were unambiguous 
and only applied to the property as it existed in its 
unimproved state at the time the lease was consummated. In 
their cross-appeal, the Howes argue that even though $2,000,000 
15/ Even according to the Howes' theory, at best, attorneys' 
fees would have to be prorated between the default 
allegations upon which the Howes prevailed, and those 
upon which they failed. This would be impossible to do 
from the affidavits of fees submitted by their counsel. 
Also, the reliance at page 50 note 46 of the Howes' brief 
on "current practice" regarding these affidavits is of no 
avail if this practice fails to comply with the rules of 
evidence. 
in tenant-funded improvements have already been made, Manivest 
was in default for failing to expend an additional $350,000 for 
structural roof and parking lot repairs. Again, these 
allegations of default were not the subject of any notice or 
opportunity to cure. Also, the evidence proffered by the 
HowesJ-§-/ was irrelevant because it pertained not to the 
status of the property as it existed prior to the May 31, 1988 
termination notice, but to the status of the property in 1989 
and 1990. 
The thrust of the Howes' argument is that because the 
original parties to the lease contemplated that the tenant 
would build a shopping center, and because the lease is a "net" 
lease, the tenant is required to make massive structural 
improvements, even though there is no such specific requirement 
expressed in the lease. However, this argument overlooks two 
points. First, the lease did not require that the shopping 
center be built, but only gave the tenant the option to do so. 
The property could have remained unimproved. Second, even a 
"net" lease does not bind the tenant to make structural 
repairs, absent an express and specific lease term requiring 
such repairs. 
Mobil Oil Credit Corp. v. DST Realty, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 
658 (Mo. App. 1985) involved the lease of an eight-story office 
building, the lower three floors of which constituted a parking 
16/ In addition to the Howes' proffers, much of the evidence 
on the maintenance issues came in through the back door, 
on the "health and safety" issues. 
garage. The landlord contended the tenant was required by the 
lease to fund the cost of over $400,000 in structural repairs 
to the parking garage. The lease was a long-term (10 years 
with an option to extend for an additional five years) "net" 
lease containing general requirements for the tenant to 
maintain the premises and make all repairs. However, the lease 
did not specifically address the structural repairs at issue, 
and the Court held that this was fatal to the landlord's claim. 
The court first noted the general rule that M. . .a 
tenant cannot be held for substantial structural repairs unless 
it so specifically agrees in the lease. A general covenant of 
a tenant to make ordinary repairs does not require him to make 
structural repairs." 689 S.W.2d 660 (citations omitted). The 
court rejected the landlord's argument that a "net" lease 
necessarily requires the tenant to make such repairs "because 
of what it is called rather than what it does". Id., (citations 
omitted). "The . . . portions of the lease defining a 'net1 
lease . . . cannot be used to create a promise to make the 
present repairs." Id., (citations omitted) .—y 
17/ Mobil Oil applies with even greater force here, because, 
unlike Mobil Oil, the improvements here were originally 
constructed by the tenant rather than the landlord. 
Thus, paragraph 3 of the lease here provides that these 
improvements " . . . shall remain the property of the 
Lessees so long as this Lease remains in full force and 
effect." Certainly Manivest retained discretion 
regarding structural maintenance of its own property, 
especially where the Howes' reversionary interest in that 
property would not have come to fruition (absent 
premature termination) for over 25 years. 
Moreover, the Howes' position on Manivest's 
responsibility to fund hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
structural repairs is at odds with its position on use of the 
lease for tenant financing. How was Manivest to fund these 
repairs without using the lease as security for financing 
them? Once again, the Howes manufactured a default that 
couldn't be cured by requiring Manivest to make structural 
repairs, while depriving Manivest of the ability to finance 
those repairs. 
CONCLUSION 
Ironically, in the conclusion to their brief at p. 54, 
the Howes focus on the equities: " . . . [A] party which 
invokes equity . . . must demonstrate that it comes with clean 
hands. Equity does not protect one who has been 
unfair . . . ". However, these principles apply not just to 
parties seeking to avoid a forfeiture, but to parties seeking 
to cause a forfeiture as well. It is the Howes, not Manivest, 
who come to court with unclean hands, and who have acted 
unfairly. The equities require that the judgment of forfeiture 
be reversed and the lease reinstated, or at least that a new 
trial be held. 
DATED this 16th day of July, 1991. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
5s A. Boevers 
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GERRIT M. STEENBLIK 
Two North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
(602) 262-5846 
March 30, 1988 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
255 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Larry: 
I am writing you on behalf of the current lessors 
pursuant to that certain Lease and Option Agreement dated October 
14, 1960 first made by and among Earl E. Howe, Vivian Howe, 
John 0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors, and J. E. Lehnherr, 
Herman L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, d/b/a Valley Shopping 
Center, as Lessees (the "Lease"). 
It is our position that Manivest, as the successor 
to the Lessees, is in default of covenants in the Lease, including 
but not limited to the following: 
1. The covenant to keep the premises free and clear 
of all liens and encumbrances; 
2. The covenant not to assign the Lease without 
our prior written consent; and 
3. The covenant to maintain the premises and to 
keep them free from weeds and other obnoxious growth. 
For example, Manivest*s letter of January 22, 1988 
failed to disclose that on January 5, 1988, Manivest encumbered 
the premises by recording a Trust Deed and Assignment of Rents 
and by filing a Financing Statement in favor of Valley Bank 
and Trust Company. These encumbrances and Manivestfs attempt 
to conceal them from us constitute flagrant violations of the 
Lease. Moreover, without seeking our "prior" consent, Manivest 
assigned its leasehold interest to Valley Bank and Trust Company 
ADD. "A" 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
March 30, 1988 
Page 2 
on December 8, 1987. Furthermore, we recently inspected the 
shopping center and discovered that there are piles of 
Christmas-time trash and last year's crop of obnoxious weeds 
still located on the Premises, and that the surface of the parking 
lot is not and for some period of time has not been in good 
order or repair. 
Based upon these defaults, it is our position that 
we are entitled to terminate Manivest's rights under the Lease. 
At this time, I am also forwarding a transmittal letter 
and four checks which Salt Lake County recently sent to Robert 
E. Howe and me. Apparently, these checks represent the 1987 
property taxes refunded as a result of the appeal which Manivest 
filed with the Salt Lake County Board of Equalization. The 
checks are as follows: 
Check No. 29065 — $ 872.72 
Check No. 29066 — $ 2,908.95 
Check No. 29068 — $ 727.25 
Check No. 29067—$10,035.95 
Robert E. Howe and I have both now had the opportunity to endorse 
these checks to Manivest. 
GMS/pmn ^ ~ 
Enclosures 
cc: Mr. and Mrs. John 0. Howe 
Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Howe 
Mr. and Mrs. William K. Evans 
GERRIT M. STEENBLIK 
Two North Central Avenue 
Phoenix, Arizona 85004 
(602) 262-5846 
April 29, 1988 
CERTIFIED MAIL—RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
255 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Larry: 
We have considered your letter dated April 1, 1988, 
and, to say the least, we are very disappointed. "Running your 
business" does not give you the right to jeopardize ours. 
But for the single first mortgage referred to in 
paragraph 14 of the Lease, there is no justification whatsoever 
for the Valley Bank loan. Notwithstanding statements to the 
contrary in your April 1st letter, the Valley Bank loan clearly 
is intended to and does affect our position as lessors. Among 
other things, the Assignment of Lease and accompanying 
Acknowledgement which you sent us on January 22, 198 8 asked 
us to agree that 
(1) Manivest had the right to assign the Lease to 
the bank; 
(2) the bank would be entitled to succeed to possession 
of the leased premises and to exercise all rights under the 
Lease; 
(3) the bank would be entitled to 15 days notice of 
any claim or default; and 
(4) Manivest was thereby encumbering our interest 
in the property. 
Moreover, the form of the deed of trust as recorded demonstrates 
your intent to encumber our interest, not merely yours. 
Mr. Larry K. Leeper 
April 29, 1988 
Page 2 
In our opinion, you are being less than candid to 
suggest that this kind of borrowing is in the_"ordinary course" 
of your business, or that it "does nor affecz the lessor's 
position," or that "the assignment is only for security purposes." 
The existing encumbrances and Manives-'s attempt to conceal 
them are flagrant violations of the Lease. 
On behalf of the lessors, I hereby advise you that 
time is of the essense and that we insist upon strict performance 
of all of the covenants, restrictions and conditions in the 
Lease. 
GMS/pmn 
Very truly v^rs, 
cc: Mr. Robert E. Howe 
Mr. John D. Howe 
Ms. Carole Evans 
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May 31, 1988 
CERTIFIED MAIL AND PROCESS SERVER 
Mr. Ernest C. Psarras 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
255 East 400 South, S^ aite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: South Lake Shopping Center 
Dear Mr. Psarras: 
This law firm represents the current lessors pursuant 
to that certain Lease and Option Agreement dated October 14, 
1960, first made by and among Earl E.-Howe, Vivian Howe, John 
0. Howe and Maxine Howe, as Lessors, and J. E. Lehnherr, Herman 
L. Franks and Stanford L. Hale, d/b/a Valley Shopping Center, 
as Lessees (the "Lease"). It is our understanding that Profes-
sional Manivest, Inc. ("Manivest") is the successor to the 
Lessees. 
OUR CLIENTS HEREBY GIVE FORMAL NOTICE THAT THE LEASE 
IS TERMINATED EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY UPON YOUR FIRST RECEIPT OF 
THIS LETTER. 
It is our clients1 position that Manivest has breached 
several covenants of the Lease, including but not limited to 
the following: 
1. The covenant to keep the premises free and clear 
of all liens and encumbrances whatsoever; 
2. The covenant not to assign the Lease without 
the Lessors1 prior written consent; and 
Mr. Ernest C. Psarras 
Professional Manivest, Inc. 
May 31, 1988 
Page two 
3. The covenant to maintain the premises and to keep 
the premises free from weeds and other obnoxious growth. 
The Lease provides an express forfeiture provision. 
Pursuant to paragraph 9, the Lease is automatically terminated 
upon Manivest1s failure to keep any covenant for a period of 
60 days. The Lease expressly provides that there is no require-
ment for notice, and it does not grant any opportunity for cure. 
Notwithstanding these terms, our clients have given 
Manivest every reasonable opportunity to remedy these breaches. 
By letters dated March 30, 1988 and April 29, 1988, they formally 
demanded that Manivest comply with its obligations. By ignoring 
these demands, Manivest has left our clients with no alternative 
but to declare the Lease to be terminated and to retake posses-
sion of the premises. 
Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the Lease, you are hereby 
instructed to surrender possession of the premises to our clients 
by promptly delivering to this law firm all necessary keys and 
operating documents pertaining to the premises. Our clients 
hereby formally assert their right to take possession of the pre-
mises and to lease the space for their own behalf. 
Since our clients became aware of the foregoing breaches 
of the Lease they have not accepted or negotiated any rent checks. 
In connection with the termination of the Lease, our clients 
are prepared to, and do hereby, tender return of all such rent 
checks to you; provided, however, that such a return of rent 
checks does not constitute a waiver of our clients' right to the 
reasonable rental value of the premises after the date of default 
and termination. Please advise me as to where these checks 
should be delivered. 
Very truly yours, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
LGM/dd 
Larry G. Moore 
